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Book Review: Bernard Lewis, What Went Wrong? The Clash Between Islam and Modernity in 
the Middle East (London: Weidenfeld & Nicholson, 2002, 180 pp., £12.99, hbk.); Bernard Lewis, 
The Crisis of Islam: Holy War and Unholy Terror (London: Weidenfeld & Nicholson, 2003,144 
pp., £12.99, hbk.) 
 
Bernard Lewis has distilled his thoughts in both books with cogency (and some repetition from his 
recent works) to articulate the bewilderment, frustration and hopes of those who censure our 
trajectile vision of modernity.  
What Went Wrong? surveys the ill-conceived solutions and consecutive failures of the Ottomans, 
legatees par excellence of the Arab faith; the rulers of South East Europe, North Africa and the 
Middle East; and Christendom’s six-century-old rivalry in the economic, educational and cultural 
spheres. Interspersed with amusing and revealing vignettes, Lewis highlights the mixed results and 
foibles of human character.  
Propinquity and rivalry shaped the mutually conflicting imaginings of Muslims and Westerners 
whose impressions linger despite the waning of more opprobrious notions. Backsliding was acutely 
experienced first on the battlefield where external territories, followed by the empire’s heartland, 
were lost to burgeoning European military superiority. The brusque candour among Ottomans about 
their failures, especially NamWk Kemal’s sage observation on the status of women, is admirable (p. 
70). Despite assumption of the trappings of modernity (technology, electoral process), and devising 
blueprints for sieving and blending attributes of Western liberalism with puritanical ideals, 
contemporary Islamists eschew revising the scriptural status quo to extend socio-doctrinal parity to 
women and minorities because the former violates the male’s domestic superiority and social 
standing while the latter is tantamount to downgrading the primacy of Islam in this world and the 
next. The devil in the detail, then as now, is that the ‘underlying philosophy and the sociopolitical 
context of these scientific achievements proved more difficult to accept or even to recognize’ (p. 81). 
Lewis can skilfully portray features — unlike injudicious relativists and academics who deferentially 
gloss over iniquities in non-Western societies — with forthright accuracy, as for example (p. 63): ‘In 
the West, one makes money in the market, and uses it to buy or influence power. In the East, one 
seizes power, and uses it to make money.’ For ‘vicegerent’ read vice-regent (p. 97) Western art-form 
music certainly flourishes in East Asia but not South Asia where it is ‘profoundly alien’ except among 
‘Westernized enclaves’ of anglicised Parsis, Christians and Jews (p. 136) A forceful sequel, The Crisis 
of Islam brings the story down to Usama bin Ladin’s clarion call to slaughter ‘Jews and Crusaders’ 
and the September 11 tragedy. It occasionally reads like some thinly-concealed white paper 
exhorting regime change, a Capitol Hill shibboleth among Cheney, Perle and Wolfowitz, Lewis’s 
ideological confreres.  
Lewis’s analysis here is occasionally skewed: the anti-American writings of select German 
intellectuals such as Rilke, Heidegger and Spengler (p. 53) are not generally read by Middle 
Easterners for whom London and Paris are their intellectual cosmopolises with their conduits of 
social thought and knowledge transmission. Besides, lofty disdain for America and things American is 
a venerable topos in French literature from Stendhal to Sartre (Baudrillard confessed albeit 
exaggeratedly for all, ‘Al-Qa’ida did it, but we willed it’); and Lewis would know better the de rigueur 
anti-Americanisms — and subtler anti-Semitisms — of the Establishment. Describing the ‘aftermath’ 
in post-’53 Iran as ‘remarkably mild’, by avoiding mention of the Shah’s 25-year repressive rule aided 
by the despised SAVAK, is gratuitous (p. 56). Moreover, the BrzezinskiBazargan handshake was 
confirmation for the radical students and populace of a done deal, not ‘some accommodation’ for, 
conscious of Mussadiq’s removal through the CIA-MI6-sponsored coup, they suspected a complot in 
the offing to rehabilitate the ailing despot (p. 64).  
Mobsters torched the American chancery in Islamabad upon Khomeni’s broadcast calumny that 
Americans and Zionists (the latter included in the Ayatollah’s original declaration but omitted by 
Lewis) had defiled the Meccan sanctuary. That demonstration, however, was not ‘in support of the 
rebels’ holed up in Mecca (p. 63). Pakistani fundamentalists could not be aware of — let alone 
support — the seizure of the precinct by Juhayman al-Utaybi on November 20, 1979, at the end of 
the pilgrimage season and the first day of 1400, the new Islamic century, since the Saudis had cut off 
communication links with the outside world in the immediate after-hours of the revolt. Given the 
signification of messianic movements by self-styled mahdis, the timing and brief examination of this 
and other uprisings merit notice in the useful chapter on Saudi bankrolling and Wahhabisation of 
activists and institutions (pp. 93-105) or in the balanced discussion on jihad (pp. 23-36). Britain, not 
‘Israel’, is targeted in chants as ‘Little Satan’ in present day Iran (p. 66). ‘Sinkiang’ must be 
transliterated as Xinjiang (p. 69f.). Ibn Saud was born in 1876, not ‘ca. 1880’ (p. 95).  
Lewis laments that the imperial impact was briefer in the Middle East; yet extremism did not decline 
after the departure of the colonists discredited monarchs and oil conglomerates (pp. 44, 55). Iraq, 
former South Yemen and the Persian Gulf oligarchies were surely bequeathed competent 
bureaucracies, infrastructures and armed forces but not valuable expertise in self-governance and 
civil society as were the successor states of British India. 
The clout successfully wielded by AIPAC and other pro-Israeli pressure groups in influencing 
decision-making, contrasted with the feeble success of Arab and Islamic lobbies — some of which 
allegedly maintain links with dubious outfits abroad — gives lie to the fact that American support for 
Israel is predicated simply on ‘ideological or sentimental’ and ‘strategic’ considerations (p. 75). The 
belief that the US is not an honourable arbiter is palpable among Muslims and pervasive among 
others, including quite a few fair-minded Americans and Israelis who, alas, are uncharitably 
dismissed as anti-Semites or self-detesting Jews. Palestine is among the most conspicuous 
grievances for which non-Muslims in the Islamic world, perennial second-class citizens, have 
endured the wrath of Islamists and witnessed marked deterioration in their relations with Muslims, 
especially after the Afghanistan and now the Iraq campaigns. It is rash, therefore, to declare that 
American policy in the Middle East compared to other regions is ‘a success’ (p. 76). Unlike 
recollections of the high-handed European, the unpretentious American traveller, scholar or Peace 
Corps volunteer encountered immense goodwill and adulation from the masses of the Middle East 
and South Asia. This is now perhaps a fond memory set against the frequent kidnappings and 
murders during the last three decades of academics, diplomats, expatriates, journalists, marines and 
missionaries.  
These disagreements are not registered as a belittlement of Professor Lewis’s prolific erudition and 
customary lucidity from which many, including this reviewer, have profited. Both works, especially 
the latter, are sobering commentaries on the tragedy of a once brilliant, eclectic civilisation. They are 
salutary reading too compared to the superficial fare dished out in America and the anti-American 
drivel discharged elsewhere. 
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